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We examine the effect of the minimum wage on restaurant prices. We contribute to both the 
study of economic impact of the minimum wage and to the micro patterns of price stickiness. 
For that purpose, we use a unique dataset of individual price quotes collected to calculate the 
Consumer Price Index in France and we estimate a price rigidity model based on a flexible 
(S; s) rule. We find a positive and significant impact of the minimum wage on prices. The 
effect of the minimum wage on prices is however very protracted. The aggregate impact 
estimated with our model takes more than a year to fully pass through to retail prices. 
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The economic e⁄ects of the minimum wage are at the heart of a long-lasting controversy. Recent
and in￿ uential works by Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1994) have revived
this controversy. Focusing on US fast-food restaurants, in which employees paid at the minimum
wage are a substantial part of the labor force, they ￿nd little evidence of an e⁄ect of the minimum
wage on employment. Neumark and Wascher (2000) have disputed their result. Using payroll
data, they found evidence of a negative employment e⁄ect. Card and Krueger (2000) have
subsequently challenged this result by using the same payroll data. Although most of the
controversy has focused on the impact of the minimum wage on employment (Brown, 1999),
changes in the minimum wage may have an impact on prices as well. However, evidence on the
price e⁄ect of the minimum wage is relatively scant for the moment (Lemos, 2008). In the case
of fast-food restaurants, available evidence include papers by Card and Krueger (1994) and by
McDonald and Aaronson (2006).
The present paper uses individual price quotes and a microeconometric approach to assess
the impact of the minimum wage on prices in restaurants in France. Like in the US, French
restaurants are well suited for assessing the e⁄ect of minimum wage increases since the proportion
of employees paid at the minimum wage is high in this industry (around 40%). Moreover, wage
setting is not a⁄ected by collective bargaining in restaurants, because collective agreements are
very scarce in this industry composed of very small ￿rms. Our price dataset is unique and
consists of thousands of monthly price quotes collected in restaurants between 1994 and 2003 by
the French Statistical Institute (Insee, Paris) to compute the Consumer Price Index (see Baudry
et al., 2007, for an overall analysis of price stickiness using these data).
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we provide new estimates of impact of
minimum wage increases on prices by using microdata. This approach was introduced by Katz
and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1994) who used a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimation
strategy.1 More recent studies have used panel data with a larger time-dimension. For instance,
1Since the minimum wage in France is binding at the national level, all ￿rms are equally concerned. Thus
there is no possibility to apply a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences methodology requiring the existence of a valid control
group.
3using BLS data, McDonald and Aaronson (2006) ￿nd a positive and fast impact of the minimum
wage on prices. Using the same type of data, our econometric strategy is however di⁄erent since
we build a microeconometric non-linear model which accounts both for the infrequency of price
adjustments and the size of price changes. This strategy allows us to better capture delayed
e⁄ects of the minimum wage on prices and to analyze the aggregation of non-linear pricing rules
adopted by heterogenous agents.2
Our paper also adds to the empirical literature on price rigidity. Price rigidity is a crucial
issue in macroeconomics. After a shock, macroeconomic dynamics typically depends on micro-
economic features, like price-setting behaviour of the ￿rms (see, for instance, Goodfriend and
King, 1997). A recurrent challenge for economists is to understand the mechanisms underpin-
ning the infrequency of price adjustments. In particular, price changes in the services sector
are known to be rare. In the euro area and in the US, only 5.6% and 15% of service prices
are respectively modi￿ed each month (compared with 15% and 25% for prices composing the
overall CPI). Restaurant prices are a particularly sticky component of services, with respective
frequencies of price changes of 4.7% and 9.0% (Bils and Klenow, 2004 and Dhyne et al., 2006).
Restaurant prices thus appear as an ideal item for assessing price rigidity models. In addition,
industries with very sticky prices are of particular interest from a monetary policy perspective:
Aoki (2001) shows that the optimal monetary policy should put more emphasis on stabilizing
the in￿ ation rate in the stickiest sectors. Some recent papers have looked at restaurant prices
with a sticky price perspective. For instance, Gaiotti and Lippi (2005) and Hobijn et al. (2006)
have proposed theoretical models to explain the pricing behaviour of restaurants during the
euro cash changeover. Using microdata for European and Italian restaurants, they build and
calibrate theoretical models to test di⁄erent theoretical assumptions and provide some insights
into the mechanisms underpinning the in￿ ation peak at the euro cash changeover date. Goette
et al. (2005) report some empirical evidence about the price adjustment of various items sold in
2Another possibility is to use aggregate sectoral data. Adopting this approach, Lee and O￿ Roarke (1999) ￿nd
a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the minimum wage on prices. Aaronson (2001) uses time-series reduced-form equations for
estimating the reaction of the price subindices of the CPI (in the U.S. and Canada) to an increase of the minimum
wage. He obtains some evidence of a lagged and positive impact of minimum wage increases on prices.
4Swiss restaurants. They show that the size of price changes does not respond to in￿ ation while
the key variable in the variability of in￿ ation seems to be the frequency of price changes. Our
contribution is to estimate a microeconometric model that links restaurant prices to costs. By
contrast, many empirical studies of price adjustment approximate marginal cost using a sectoral
in￿ ation rate (see, for instance, Cecchetti, 1986, and FougŁre et al., 2007) or an unobserved
synthetic factor (Dhyne et al., 2007). Here, the large proportion of workers paid the minimum
wage in French restaurants motivates our focus on the minimum wage as a relevant measure of
￿rms￿marginal cost. We are then able to determine to what extent observed price stickiness in
this industry may result from cost stickiness.
Our main ￿ndings are the following. The minimum wage has a positive and signi￿cant impact
on prices in restaurants, in line with the weight of low-wage labor in total costs. However,
contrary to other studies, we exhibit a protracted impact of the minimum wage on prices.
Changes in the minimum wage can take more than a year to pass through to retail prices. As
a result, stickiness in restaurant prices is not just the mere re￿ ection of stickiness in its main
determinants.
The next section presents the dataset used as well as the main features of restaurant price
adjustments in France. Section 3 presents our econometric model of price rigidity. Estimation
results and an assessment of the overall ￿t of the model are presented in Section 4. In Section
5, we simulate the model to assess the aggregate e⁄ect of the minimum wage on prices. We
compare the response obtained from these microsimulations with those obtained from a linear




Our data are extracted from a longitudinal dataset of monthly price quotes collected by the
French Statistical Institute (Insee, Paris) from July 1994 to February 2003 to compute the
5Consumer Price Index (CPI). Each observation is the price of a speci￿c item (here a menu or a
course) in a particular outlet (here a restaurant). Prices are inclusive of all taxes. Along with the
price level, an individual product code (the outlet and the product category), the year and the
month of the record are also available; they allow us to follow the price of a product through time.
Prior to estimation, some speci￿c data treatments have been done. Due to holidays, ￿missing￿
prices are quite frequent. The French Statistical Institute (Insee, Paris) generally replaces them
with the average price observed in other outlets in the same area. But this procedure may
introduce some spurious price changes. Thus, we assume that the price does not change when
the restaurant is temporarily closed. As the euro cash changeover is included in our observation
period, we divide all prices recorded before 2002:1 by 6.55957, the o¢ cial French franc/euro
exchange rate. Details on data treatments are provided in Baudry et al. (2007) and FougŁre et
al. (2007).
Our analysis is focused on restaurant prices. We distinguish between traditional and fast-
food restaurants, since the pricing strategy of these two types of outlets is markedly di⁄erent,
as shown below. Several types of items are observed in our dataset: hors d￿ ￿uvre, desserts,
main course, wine, meals in traditional restaurants, and meals in fast-food restaurants. We
choose to restrict our sample to full meals in traditional and fast-food restaurants since they are
the most representative items, and because data on full meals are more systematically recorded
in restaurants (while the other items may not be systematically reported). The meal in a
traditional restaurant typically consists of a starter plus a main course or a main course plus a
dessert. In fast-food restaurants, it consists of a hamburger, french fries and a soft drink. Prices
in restaurants are always inclusive of service and value-added tax (VAT). Note that the VAT rate
for take-away food is lower than for traditional restaurants (5.5% versus 19.6%). Our database
contains 93,816 price quotes for the item ￿menu in a traditional restaurant￿ , corresponding to
2,948 di⁄erent restaurants, and 10,726 observations for the item ￿menu in a fast-food restaurant￿ ,
corresponding to 448 di⁄erent fast-food restaurants.
Figure 1 displays examples of actual price trajectories for a full meal price in traditional
restaurants. Price changes do not occur continuously. This pattern is quite typical of sticky
prices: long periods of price stability are interspersed with small or large price increases. In
6the following section, we document the main characteristics of price rigidity in traditional and
fast-food restaurants.
[Figure 1]
2.1.2 Patterns of price rigidity
The frequency of price changes is generally considered as a good indicator of price rigidity (e.g.
Bils and Klenow, 2004, Dhyne et al., 2006). In our sample, restaurant prices and, to a lesser
extent, fast-food prices are very rigid. On average, around 4% of traditional restaurant prices
and 9.4% of fast-food prices are modi￿ed each month in France, compared to around 19% on
average for all CPI price quotes (Baudry et al., 2007). As a result, the duration of a price spell
is on average equal to two years in restaurants and to less than one year in fast-food restaurants
(see Table 1). This result is quite consistent with previous ￿ndings in the US and in the euro
area. Using US data, MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) ￿nd that around 13% of restaurant prices
change every two months, implying a monthly frequency of price changes equal to 6.5%. For the
euro area, Dhyne et al. (2006) report a frequency equal to 4.7%. Owing to this apparently high
degree of stickiness, restaurant prices seem to be a good candidate for the estimation of price
rigidity models.
[Table 1] [Figure 3]
The infrequency of price changes is often explained by the existence of price adjustment
costs. As noticed by Fisher and Konieczny (2006), these costs can be divided into three cate-
gories. First, some costs, called menu-costs, are associated with printing new menus or labels.
The second category includes the costs of the decision-making process, e.g. collecting informa-
tion, analyzing changes in the ￿optimal￿nominal price in the absence of adjustment costs, and
deciding the amount of the price change. The last type of costs could occur in the event of
an unfavourable reaction from customers to price increases; these costs could be called ￿antag-
onization costs￿ . In restaurants, these three types of costs are likely to be at stake. Note that in
traditional restaurants, managers may choose a decrease in quantity or quality of food in their
7standard menu as a substitute to a price increase. This reaction would strengthen the case for
antagonization costs with respect to price changes. Such a strategy is however not possible for
standardized products like fast-food restaurant items, which may rationalize the higher degree
of price stickiness in traditional restaurants.
Figure 3 displays the frequency of price changes over time for the two types of restaurants
considered here. The frequency of price changes is quite stable over time, except in some speci￿c
months. In the case of traditional restaurants, the frequency of price changes has noticeable
peaks in January and September, the frequency value being around 5% in these two months
versus around 3% in other months.3 In fast-food restaurants, the frequency of price changes
displays less regular patterns. However, in January, February and July, around 10% of prices are
modi￿ed, against less than 7% on average during the year.4 Such seasonal price changes may
result from the costs associated with the price-change decision. As documented by Zbaracki et
al. (2004), adjusting prices is a long process which can last a whole year because managers have
to collect information on competitors and monitor the cost developments. Moreover, as shown by
M￿ller et al. (2009), the opportunity cost of adjusting prices may increase in some periods of the
year in which managers face a higher store tra¢ c (for example during holidays). So, managers
may prefer revising their prices according to a discrete-time process (in speci￿c periods of the
year) rather than continuously (see Fisher and Konieczny, 2006, for some empirical evidence).
In our case, January and September correspond to the re-opening of traditional restaurants after
holidays. Price changes during these months would then be less costly.
2.1.3 The distribution of price changes
A speci￿c feature of price changes in services is the low proportion of price decreases: 20% of
price changes are decreases while this proportion is around 40% for the whole CPI (Baudry et
al., 2007). The degree of downward price rigidity is even higher in traditional restaurants: more
than 90% of price changes are increases and only 10% are price decreases. Prices in fast-food
3This calculation does not take account of years 2002 and 2003, which have very speci￿c patterns due to the
impact of the euro cash changeover.
4This calculation does not take account of years 2002 and 2003. See the previous footnote.
8restaurants also exhibit, though to a lesser extent, some nominal downward rigidity. In fast-food
restaurants, 24% of price changes are price decreases. Two interpretations for nominal downward
rigidity can be invoked. First, marginal costs may rarely decrease. Second, it could also be a
consequence of customer antagonization costs: Rotemberg (2005) develops a model in which
consumers may react negatively to price changes and Zbaracki et al. (2004) show the empirical
relevance of these antagonization costs. A restaurant manager may thus be reluctant to reduce
the price immediately if he/she expects that the price will rise again in the future, which implies
that the adjustment cost will have to be paid again. Although it is unlikely that a price decrease
would entail customer anger, one can assume that the prospect of future antagonization costs
could prevent current price decreases.
[Table 2] [Figure 4]
The distribution of price changes is represented in Figure 4. While a simple menu-cost frame-
work would suggest that, as price changes are rare, the size of price changes should be rather
large, we observe that the proportion of small price changes is substantial. Around 25% of the
price increases are smaller than 1.6% in traditional restaurants and smaller than 1.3% in fast-
food restaurants (Table 2). We also note that the average size of a price decrease is larger than
the size of a price increase (Table 2). The distribution of price changes is also characterized by
a noticeable proportion of large price changes: in traditional restaurants 10% of price increases
are larger than 8% (while 10% of price decreases are smaller than -13%). One possible inter-
pretation is that, although customers may react more strongly to a large price increase than to
small repeated price increases, some ￿rms may prefer implementing large price changes because
of ￿xed costs associated with price changes.
To sum up, large price decreases are common and small price increases are not rare. Mac-
Donald and Aaronson (2006) observe similar patterns for US restaurant prices: the price change
distribution is asymmetric, the proportion of small price changes is important, 12% of price
changes are large (above 10%), and the average size of price increases is smaller, in absolute
value, than the average size of price decreases.
92.2 Determinants of price changes
Our aim is to investigate determinants of price changes. Following Cecchetti (1986) and Ratfai
(2006), we assume that the price adjusts infrequently to an unobserved optimal ￿frictionless￿
price which depends on the structure of costs and demand. This optimal price is typically
de￿ned by a mark-up over marginal costs. Our starting point is that, in restaurants, labor costs
and input costs (food prices) are the main elements of marginal costs.
2.2.1 Labor costs and the minimum wage
We expect labor costs to be a major element of costs in restaurants. According to national
accounts, the share of total compensation in costs is around 40% in traditional restaurants and
33% in fast-food restaurants (on average between 1997 and 2002). For fast-food restaurants,
we can also use Parsley and Wei (2007)￿ s cost function estimation for Big Mac hamburgers (a
standardized product) as another benchmark. They ￿nd that labor costs represent around 46%
of total costs.
In French restaurants, most of the labor costs consist of the wages of employees paid the
minimum wage. In restaurants and hotels, more than 40% of employees are paid the minimum
wage (DARES, 2003). This ratio is particularly high as compared to the national proportion
of employees paid the minimum wage, which lies between 12% and 15% over the observation
period. Moreover, minimum wage increases may spill over to wages of employees above the
minimum wage. Koubi and Lhommeau (2006) ￿nd that the elasticity for restaurants and hotels
is estimated at 0.7 for wages lower than 1.1 times the minimum wage. This implies that a
minimum wage increase is expected to indirectly but rapidly a⁄ect a wider share of labor costs
in restaurants.
In France, the minimum wage (SMIC, Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance) is
set a national level. It applies to all employees and types of ￿rms, and minimum wage increases
are binding. The minimum wage is raised each year in July according to a legal rule, which
is based on the partial indexation to past in￿ ation and to past wage growth. Besides these
indexation procedures, the government may decide on a discretionary basis to amplify the raise.
10Over the sample period, the minimum wage was mostly changed in July, except in 1996 when it
was also increased in May. We observe some variability among the minimum wage increases over
the period: most of the minimum wage increases were in the interval +1.2% to +4% (see Figure
2). Over the period, the minimum wage increases were on average higher than the overall wage
growth. In parallel, the successive French governments implemented policies that consisted in
reducing employer social security contributions on low wages. For instance, the employer social
security contribution rate at the level of the minimum wage was brought from 24.8% to 12.0%
in September 1995 and to 4.2% in January 2003.5 The index for the labor cost at the minimum
wage level that we use hereafter takes into account this rate.
[Figure 2]
Measuring wages and costs in the restaurant industry raises speci￿c issues, which could bias
the estimated impact of the minimum wage on labor costs. First, it is known that a fraction of
restaurant employees are hired on the black market.6 But we can assume that the wage level on
the black market is proportional to the minimum wage level. Second, tips are not reported in
the available price quotes. Tips are however a limited concern since a service charge is included
in restaurant prices; thus tips may contribute to the incomes of employees, but they do not
a⁄ect restaurant cost functions. They may a⁄ect restaurant decisions only indirectly, through
the opportunity to o⁄er a lower wage against the payment of tips. In addition, tips are optional
and there is no standard convention or social norm in France as to their level. Our assessment
is that tips are unlikely to bias our estimates.
2.2.2 Other costs, demand and speci￿c events
Another obvious cost consists of food inputs. For fast-food restaurants, Parsley and Wei (2007)
￿nd that food inputs represent 31.6% of costs to produce a Big Mac hamburger. In this study, we
use an aggregate price index to approximate the price of inputs, namely the producer price index
5Contribution rates are taken from OFCE (2003, table 1, page 230).
6Measuring the size of the black-market is extremely di¢ cult. A recent study by the Central Agency of Social
Security Organizations (ACOSS) estimates that illegal work accounts for around 12% of employees in hotels, cafØs
and restaurants in 2005.
11of food over the sample period. We also incorporate a control variable to represent the demand
level. More precisely, we use the volume of total sales in traditional and fast-food restaurants.
These two monthly series are published by the French Statistical Institute (Insee, Paris).
Two changes in VAT rates occurred during the observation period. They may have had an
impact on the pricing policy of restaurants. In August 1995, the standard VAT rate was raised
from 18.6% to 20.6%, while in April 2000 it was lowered from 20.6% to 19.6%. We construct
two dummy variables for these changes. These changes may have had non-trivial impact in
presence of menu-costs. For instance, restaurants may cluster price changes planned otherwise
at the time of the tax change. Consumers could also be more likely to accept a price rise at
the time of a tax increase because the tax increase is a macro event observable by them. Note
that the VAT rate for take-away food is 5.5%, so that fast-food restaurants are expected to be
much less a⁄ected by changes in VAT. The standard fast-food restaurant policy is to post the
same tax-included price for a given item, either for take-away or dine-in. In the case of fast-food
restaurants, the relevant VAT rate is a weighted average of the regular and low rate.
Finally, a dummy variable for the euro cash changeover that occurred in January 2002, as
well as two other dummies for the period just before and just after the introduction of the
euro7, are included. At the time of the euro cash changeover, all restaurants had to change their
nominal price due to the currency conversion. As already noticed by Hobijn et al. (2006), who
consider restaurants in the euro area, such an event forces ￿rms to pay a menu cost, and then
implies a clustering of price changes that would have taken place at other dates in the absence
of the euro cash changeover. As a consequence many traditional restaurants choose to change
their prices at this date or just before (see Figure 3). However, we can assume that the currency
change did not a⁄ect the long-run price level in restaurants.
7The period before the euro cash changeover begins in September 2001 and ends in December 2001. The period
after the euro introduction begins in February 2002 and ends in April 2002.
123 An econometric model of infrequent price changes
3.1 Theoretical background
Menu-cost models are the most standard theoretical approach to rationalizing infrequent price
changes. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) ￿rst showed that, in presence of menu-costs and of de-
terministic exogenous shock, the optimal price-setting behaviour of the ￿rm has the form of an
(S;s) rule. The essence of the (S;s) model is the existence of a ￿band of inaction￿ : ￿rms tolerate
some deviation from their optimal frictionless price as long as this deviation is not too large.
Dixit (1991) and Hansen (1999) then extended this basic model to allow for non-deterministic
shocks, and they proved that the optimal behaviour may still be represented by an (S;s) rule.
Note however, as discussed by Attanasio (2000), that a (S;s) policy is a solution to an optimal
pricing problem in speci￿c cases only.
In (S;s) models, the frictionless price is generally the price level that would be observed in
the absence of any costs of adjustment. It can be derived in a straightforward way under the
assumption of ￿ exible prices. If we denote by P￿
it the optimal price set by a monopolistically
competitive outlet i at date t; a standard result is that the optimal frictionless price is given by
a markup over marginal costs MCit, i.e. P￿
it = kiMCit. Assuming that the production function
has two inputs, labor and food, maximizing pro￿t under an isoelastic demand curve yields a
log-linear expression for the optimal price, similar to that obtained, for instance, by Rotemberg
(1982) and Cecchetti (1986):
p￿
it = ai + bwt + cqt + dyt (1)
where wt and qt are the logarithms of costs of labor and food, respectively, and yt is the demand
level.
In the presence of adjustment costs, ￿rms trade o⁄between the opportunity cost of deviating
from the optimal price (i.e. the foregone pro￿t) and the adjustment cost. Under some conditions
shown to be of the (S;s) type, the optimal adjustment rule is then to adjust the price only if
the di⁄erence between the optimal price p￿
it and the price pit￿￿ modi￿ed at period t ￿ ￿ (where
￿ is the duration since the last price change), exceeds some threshold. We assume that when
prices are reset they are set at the optimal frictionless price (up to a constant, like in the paper
13by Tsiddon, 1993). If the price was changed ￿ periods before, then pit￿1 = pit￿￿ = p￿
it￿￿: The
￿rm￿ s pricing decision depends on the distance covered by p￿
it between dates t ￿ ￿ and t (the
date at which the price is observed). We denote this variable by ￿￿p￿
it. If it exceeds a certain
threshold C, the price is changed.8 Allowing for error terms in the optimal price, or in the size
of the band, the probability of a price change will depend on the cumulative change in p￿
it since
the last price change.
The (S;s) model puts strong restrictions on the patterns of price adjustments. In particular,
in a standard menu-cost model, the size of the price change will be the same for all price changes
equal to C. Moreover, a large adjustment cost would imply infrequent and large price changes.
This prediction is at variance with the prevalence of infrequent but small price changes observed
in the data (see Figure 1).
To capture this pattern, we rely on time-varying menu costs following Dotsey et al. (1999).
Under such an assumption the threshold ￿ uctuates over time, as shown by Caballero and Engel
(1999) in a model of investment decision. In our model, thus, the threshold is allowed to vary over
time and across ￿rms. Our speci￿cation is rather ￿ exible. For instance, our model encompasses
the Calvo model: when the threshold varies a lot, the model predicts a constant probability for
a price change and can generate small price changes.
Overall, our approach is related to the adjustment hazard model elaborated by Caballero
and Engel (1999). In such an approach, the probability of a price change is a function of the
gap between the current price and a static frictionless optimal price. That gap is the relevant
state variable, so that despite the fact that an optimization problem underlies the decision rule,
no expectation term is explicitly present.
One additional speci￿cation issue is that, in restaurants, there could exist an alternative
adjustment margin other than price. As noticed before, restaurants may choose to decrease
quality or quantity rather than increase their prices. The existence of such an adjustment margin
is expected to lower the value of the parameter b in equation (1), compared to a standard model
8In theoretical models (see, for instance, Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977), this threshold is shown to be an increasing
function of the menu cost. However, in a reduced-form approach like ours, the adjustment cost cannot be measured
since this function depends on structural parameters that cannot be identi￿ed .
14in which this margin does not exist. Nevertheless, in our reduced-form approach, as far as wt,
qt and yt are exogenous covariates, the overall impact of the minimum wage on nominal prices
is consistently estimated.9
3.2 The econometric model
Our econometric model encompasses the (S;s) speci￿cation and is related to some empirical
models that have been previously set forth in the literature. For instance, Attanasio (2000)
has put forward a ￿ exible econometric speci￿cation for estimating (S;s) models applied to
consumption of durables. More recently, in a price-setting context, Ratfai (2006) has proposed to
estimate (S;s) models by using a probit speci￿cation, while Dhyne et al. (2007) have introduced
stochastic bands.10 On the methodological side, our distinctive feature is, with respect to the
former, to estimate a model for the size of the price change. With respect to the latter, we allow
for observed proxies of the marginal cost and potential asymmetry in the decision to change the
price.
Let us denote pit the price posted by restaurant i (i = 1;:::;n) at date t, and ￿￿p￿
i;t the
optimal price change.











Our econometric model is thus characterized by three processes, the optimal price change
￿￿p￿
i;t, and the time-varying thresholds C￿
it and C+
it associated with price decreases and price
increases, respectively.
The optimal price change is speci￿ed as:
￿￿p￿
i;t = ￿0 + ￿￿X1;t￿1 + ui + "
p
i;t (2)
9For French CPI data, the French statistical institute (INSEE, Paris) discontinues the series whenever the
nature of the product changes signi￿cantly, which limits the empirical case for such an adjustment margin.
10Ratfai (2006) studies the price of meat in Hungary, Dhyne et al.(2007) a wide range of consumer goods in
France and Belgium. See also Sheshinski et al. (1981) for an early estimation of such models.
15where ￿￿X1;t = X1t ￿ X1;t￿￿ is the variation of covariates X1;t between dates t and t ￿ ￿
(￿ being the duration since the last price change) and (￿0;￿1) is a vector of parameters to
be estimated.11 The vector of covariates X1;t includes variables a⁄ecting the cost structure,
especially the variation of the minimum wage level (our proxy for the variation of labor costs),
of the food producer price index, of the aggregate demand either in traditional or fast-food
restaurants, and of the VAT. All these variations are taken between dates t ￿ ￿ and t. The
term ui captures the time-invariant characteristics of the restaurant that may a⁄ect the optimal
price change, like di⁄erences in costs of price changes or in marginal costs.12 It is assumed to
be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿2
u, and to be stochastically independent
of the aggregate (macro) variations ￿￿X1;t: The random term "
p
i;t is a normally distributed
idiosyncratic (white noise) shock with mean 0 and variance ￿2
p:
The time-varying thresholds are speci￿ed as
C+
it = C+ + X2;t￿+
2 + vi + "c+
i;t (3)
C￿
it = C￿ + X2;t￿￿
2 + vi + "c￿
i;t
The time-varying threshold associated with price increases (respectively, price decreases) de-
pends on a constant parameter C+ (respectively C￿), and on X2;t; a vector of time-dependent
indicators, such as monthly dummies and euro cash changeover dummies13. The monthly dum-
mies are incorporated because we observe that restaurant managers are more likely to revise
their prices in January or September. This may re￿ ect that the price-change decision may vary
across months. Adjustment costs would then be lower during these months.14 We also include
11Note the ￿rst date ￿ is not observed so that the ￿rst spell is not usable for estimation. We expect however
the selection bias resulting from this omission to be small since we observe repeated spells for each restaurant.
12The random terms ui could be correlated due to local or brand e⁄ects. Unfortunately, our data set contains
no information on the location nor on the brand of restaurants.
13We assume that none of the determinants of the optimal price explains the band associated with the menu-
costs.
14Woodford (2003) writes that ￿the main bene￿t of infrequent price changes is not lower menu costs, but re-
duction of the costs associated with information collection and decisionmaking. Obtaining this bene￿t necessarily
means that the timing of the occasions upon which prices are reconsidered is largely independent of current market
conditions; for example, ￿rms often reconsider pricing policy at a particular time of year.￿
16in the vector X2;t the dummy variable indicating the euro cash changeover that occurred in
January 2002. At this date, all ￿rms had to change their prices from francs to euros, and were
thus forced to pay the menu costs, which gave them an incentive to cluster price changes at
that date (Hobijn et al., 2006). The vectors ￿+
2 and ￿￿
2 are slope parameters to be estimated.
The term vi captures the time-invariant characteristics a⁄ecting the menu cost of restaurant i.
Finally, "c+
i;t and "c￿
i;t are normally distributed random terms with mean 0 and respective vari-
ances ￿2
c+ and ￿2
c￿. These shocks are shocks on the price-change decision, resulting from shocks
on menu costs. Consistent with the theoretical models of random menu cost (e.g. Dotsey et al.,
1999), the menu cost shock is independent of the shock "
p
i;t on the optimal price.
The contribution to the likelihood function of a constant price at date t, given that the
speci￿c (random) characteristic is ui, is thus:
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The contribution to the likelihood function of a price increase in restaurant i at date t, given


























￿0 + ￿￿X1;t￿1 + ui ￿ (C+ + X2;t￿+


















where ￿ is the p.d.f of the Gaussian distribution. Let us remark that the correlation between
















Price decreases are treated separately from price increases in order to take into account the
asymmetry in price changes, which might re￿ ect antagonization costs or other di⁄erences in the
￿rm￿ s pricing policy. The contribution to the likelihood function of a price decrease in restaurant


























￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿X1;t￿1 ￿ ui + C￿ + X2;t￿￿





























In traditional restaurants, price decreases are very scarce. For this type of outlet, we pool the
occurrences of price decreases with those of no-changes. For fast-food restaurants, we allow ￿0
to be di⁄erent for price increases and for price decreases, since price decreases are di¢ cult to
capture with an equation similar to the one for price increases. This model closely proxies a
model with two regimes of price changes. The ￿rst regime is the standard regime of price changes.
The alternative one is characterized for instance by sales, i.e. large negative changes that cannot
be captured by standard economic mechanisms. Besides, we set ui = wi and vi = (1 + ￿)wi
where wi is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿2
w.












The maximization of this likelihood function is performed using the GAUSS software maxlik
procedure. A Gauss-Hermite quadrature is used to approximate numerically the integral ap-
pearing in the log-likelihood function.15 Formally our model is close to a Tobit type 2 model.
So all parameters of the model are statistically identi￿ed (see Amemiya, 1984).
3.3 Identi￿cation issues
The model raises several identi￿cation issues that are discussed in this section. In particular, we
argue that the model is able to disentangle the in￿ uence of the minimum wage on prices in spite
of the seasonality a⁄ecting both of them.
A ￿rst concern is that the degree of variability in minimum wage increases is limited. The
distribution of legal minimum wage changes, occurring each year in July, has a narrow support
during the period we consider (see Figure 2). However, this is a limited concern per se since
a discrete support does not impede identi￿ability. In addition, in our model, the right-hand
15We use 40 points of integration on the interval [￿10;10]:
19side variable is the cumulative increase in the minimum wage since the last price change. This
induces a much wider support and a higher dispersion (the distribution of this right-hand side
variable is represented in Appendix A.1) and favors identi￿cation of the minimum wage e⁄ect
on prices.
Second, a speci￿c concern here is that minimum wage systematically increases every year
in July. Using OLS time series regression to disentangle the e⁄ect of ￿minimum wage￿changes
from any seasonal ￿July￿ e⁄ect would be di¢ cult because the identi￿cation would rely on:
(i) the fact that the size of increase varies across years, (ii) there is one episode of increase
in May and (iii) there are episodes of reduction in social security contribution.16 However,
here the relevant variable is the cumulative increase in the minimum wage since the last price
change, which strongly reduces collinearity between seasonal dummies and the relevant labor
cost variable. Indeed, in our data, while the correlation in the time dimension between the
minimum wage increases and the July dummy variable is high (0.43 for traditional restaurants
and 0.34 for fast-food restaurants), the correlation between spell-speci￿c cumulative increases
and dummies is only 0.15 for traditional restaurants and 0.18 for fast-food restaurants. Another
identi￿cation issue comes from the fact that prices tend to change more frequently in September,
suggesting either a seasonal menu cost or a two-month systematic lag. This latter hypothesis
can be questioned by looking at our individual data since, for the average restaurant, the price
duration is larger than one year and close to 2 years (see Table 1). This suggests that ￿rms do
not adjust two months after a minimum wage increase but more than one year after.
A last issue is related to parameter identi￿cation in bivariate sample selection models. Our
model consists of two equations: one for the decision of price change and one for the size of the
price change. A theoretical result is that the parameters of this class of models are identi￿ed
without any restriction on the regressors. However, if exactly the same regressors appear in
both equations, the model is still identi￿ed but the identi￿cation relies on functional form
assumptions (Wooldridge, 2002). Here, we implement exclusion restrictions which strengthen
the identi￿cation of the model. The ￿rst one is related to the euro cash change-over. Economic
theory indeed strongly points out that a change in numØraire should not in￿ uence the long
16The comparison of our approach with time series linear regression is developped in details in section 5.
20run real prices or the mark-up ratio and relative price levels. It is thus natural to exclude this
variable from the size of price change equation. On the other hand, theory tells us that to the
extent that the change in numØraire entails menu costs, it is very much predicted to in￿ uence the
probability of a price change (as argued in Hobijn et al. 2006). We also argue that seasonality
provides a relevant restriction: there exists some seasonality in menu costs (due to institutional
factors like timing of holidays and accounting periods, see M￿ller et al. (2009), Woodford (2003)
and Zbaracki et al. (2004), and our Section 2.1). This seasonality only a⁄ects the menu costs
which play a role in the ￿rst equation only. Besides, since we control for demand, the price level
should not be expected to depend per se on seasonality (see above our Section 2.1).
4 Empirical results
Table 3 reports estimation results for menus in traditional restaurants while Table 4 reports
those for menus in fast-food restaurants. Parameter estimates associated with the estimation
of ￿￿p￿
i;t (equation (2)) are displayed in the ￿rst column of these tables, while those associated
with C+
it and C￿
it (equation (3)) are displayed in the second and third columns of these tables.
[Tables 3 & 4]
4.1 Minimum wage e⁄ect
The e⁄ect of the minimum wage on restaurant prices is signi￿cant for both traditional and
fast-food restaurants. A minimum wage rise increases the probability of a price increase in
both traditional and fast-food restaurants, but it decreases the probability of a price decrease
in fast-food restaurants. This result is in line with theoretical results of state-dependent pricing
models. The minimum wage thus triggers a selection e⁄ect in restaurants that change their
prices, which in￿ uences the dynamics of the pass-through (see the next section). The e⁄ect
of the minimum wage on the size of the price change is noticeable. In traditional restaurants,
after a 1% minimum wage increase, prices that change are increased by 0.08%. In fast-food
restaurants, the elasticity of price increases with respect to the minimum wage is similar, since
it is equal to 0.117. Estimates are less precise than those obtained for traditional restaurants;
21this may be due to the sample size, which is substantially smaller for fast-food restaurants. We
therefore cannot reject the assumption that the elasticity is the same in both types of outlets.
Using aggregate data for France, we are able to compare these results with benchmark
estimates obtained from a proxy of the share of compensations of workers paid at the minimum
wage in total restaurant costs (Table 5). According to available sources, the share of these labor
costs in restaurant total costs lies between 33% and 46% in fast-food restaurants and is equal
to 40% in traditional restaurants. The share of minimum wage compensations in the wage bill
is approximately 32% in fast-food restaurants and 31% in traditional restaurants. Computing
the e⁄ect of the minimum wage on costs as the product of these numbers, we ￿nd an elasticity
between 0.10 and 0.15 for fast-foods and equal to 0.12 for traditional restaurants. Taking into
account the share of black market labor (estimated to be 12%, see above), the range is lowered
to values comprised between 0.09 and 0.13. If we now take into account potential spillover from
minimum wage increases to other wages, we obtain 0.15 for traditional restaurants and a range
of estimates between 0.13 and 0.18 for fast-food restaurants. Our econometric results are lower
but consistent with these benchmark estimates.
[Table 5]
The estimated e⁄ects we obtain are somewhat higher than those found in previous studies on
US data by Aaronson (2001), MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) or Aaronson and French (2007).
These studies show that the cumulated e⁄ect of a 1% increase in the minimum wage on restaurant
prices lies between 0.04% and 0.08%.17 This gap between US and French results is explained
by the lower share of labor costs in restaurants￿ s total costs in the US (31% in full-service
restaurants and 25% in limited-service restaurants,18 versus 40% in traditional restaurants and
33% in fast-food restaurants in France) and the lower share of minimum wage compensations
in the wage bill in the US (17% versus more than 30% in France; see Aaronson and French,
2007).19
17Using US input-output data, Lee and O￿ Roark (1999) ￿nd higher elasticities, between 0.08 and 0.12.
18See Aaronson and French, 2007.
19This is partly explained by the lower share of employees paid at the minimum wage in the United States (23%
versus more than 40% in France; see Aaronson and French, 2007).
224.2 E⁄ects of input prices and demand
As expected, food input prices have a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on the variations of the
optimal price ￿p￿. The elasticities of restaurant prices with respect to input prices are quite
di⁄erent for traditional and fast-food restaurants. They stand around 0.22 and 0.48 for tradi-
tional restaurants and fast-foods restaurants, respectively. Parsley and Wei (2007) ￿nd that the
share of food input costs in total costs is around 32% for Big Mac hamburgers. Using national
accounts, the share of intermediate consumption (which include food inputs) in total costs is
around 60% in the restaurant industry. Our estimation results appear to fall in the range of
these benchmark estimates.
We ￿nd that demand has also a positive impact on ￿p￿ in the case of fast-food restaurants,
and a negative e⁄ect in the case of traditional restaurants. In the latter case this might re￿ ect a
counter-cyclical mark-up. Bils (1987) shows empirically that mark-ups could be counter-cyclical.
Portier (1995) and Chatterjee et al. (1993) propose models of procyclical entry in which the
addition of new ￿rms during booms causes mark-ups to fall (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999).
In traditional restaurants, the e⁄ect of a change in the VAT rate on ￿p￿ is asymmetrical.20
A VAT increase has a strong positive e⁄ect, but a VAT decrease has a negative but smaller (in
absolute terms) e⁄ect on ￿p￿. The 2% increase in the VAT rate in 1995 is estimated to have
triggered a price increase of 4.2%, whereas after the 1% reduction in the VAT rate in 2000, prices
that were modi￿ed decreased by 1%.
Finally, we can remark that the estimates for the variance of idiosyncratic shocks associated
with ￿p￿ are large (6.4 for traditional restaurants and 5.9 for fast food restaurants). This result
may be linked to the recent ￿ndings on the importance of idiosyncratic shocks in state-dependent
models to explain large price adjustments (Golosov and Lucas, 2007).
20Because the standard VAT rate is only marginally relevant in the case of fast-food restaurants we do not
include it in the model. When including dummies for VAT changes, results are una⁄ected and these dummies are
statistically non-signi￿cant.
234.3 Seasonality and the euro
We now discuss the e⁄ects of the variables that are assumed to a⁄ect only the decision to revise
prices, but not the target price level. These variables are dummy variables indicating the speci￿c
months of the year and the euro cash changeover.
The e⁄ect of month dummies is quite consistent with the descriptive evidence that we have
previously reported. In traditional restaurants, C+ is lower in September, January and to a
lesser extent May, than in other months, all other things being equal. This means that the
probability of a price change is signi￿cantly higher during these months. In December, this
probability is lower than in other months. In fast-food restaurants, managers are more likely
to increase their prices in January, July Au gust and December and less likely to increase in
October. They are more likely to decrease their prices at the end of the year. This might re￿ ect
the discrete-time nature of the price revision process in restaurants: speci￿c periods of the year
are more likely to be devoted to price-change decisions, because, during these periods, managers
have more time to collect information or think about the ￿optimal￿price change.
The e⁄ect of the euro cash-changeover is quite di⁄erent for the two di⁄erent items. Descrip-
tive statistics show that, in traditional restaurants, price decreases are rarely observed during
the euro cash changeover, while many prices increased just before and just after January 2002.
Our estimation con￿rms this insight. For fast-food restaurants, the frequency of price changes
increased in January 2002, but neither before nor after. Hobijn et al. (2006) propose a menu
cost interpretation for the in￿ ationary e⁄ect of the euro cash changeover in restaurants that
can rationalize such a pattern. With fast-food restaurants data, the estimated e⁄ect on the fre-
quency of price changes is rather symmetrical. Our estimates show that the probabilities of price
increases and decreases rose simultaneously in January 2002, implying no overall in￿ ationary
e⁄ect.
The variances of idiosyncratic shocks on C+ or C￿ are much lower than those obtained
for ￿p￿ (0:39 for traditional restaurants and 0:36 for fast food restaurants). Thus, seasonal
variations appear to capture most of the variability in the adjustment costs as suggested by
Woodford (2003) or Zbaracki et al. (2004).
244.4 Overall ￿t of the model
We now test the goodness of ￿t of our model by assessing its ability to match some aggregate
moments of the data. More speci￿cally, we compute three groups of indicators from the estimated
model: the frequency of price changes, the size of price changes and the in￿ ation rate. For this
purpose, we run Monte Carlo simulations on the basis of our parameter estimates. Explanatory
variables are taken at their sample values. More speci￿cally, we simulate price trajectories and
compare the aggregate results obtained with those observed. To obtain standard errors for
simulated moments, we repeat the simulation exercise a number of times by drawing several sets
of parameters from their estimated asymptotic distribution.21
[Table 6]
Results are presented in Table 6. Frequencies of price changes are slightly overestimated.
For traditional restaurants, we obtain an overall frequency of 4.1%, whereas the frequency of
price changes is only 4.2% in the data; for fast-food restaurants, the simulated frequency of
price changes is equal to 10.5%, versus 9.4% in the sample. Standard deviations are quite small:
around 0.1 percentage point for traditional restaurants and 0.3 percentage point for fast-food
restaurants.
The average sizes of price changes are well replicated. The average sizes of price increases
estimated with our model are equal to 3.4% in fast-food restaurants and 4.3% in traditional
restaurants versus respectively, 3.3% and 4.3% in the sample. For price decreases in fast-food
restaurants, the model slightly overestimates the size of price changes. Figure 5 displays the
simulated and actual distributions of price changes for both items. First, the model captures the
asymmetry of both distributions. However, our model, re￿ ecting its similarity with a menu-cost
model, fails to fully account for the share of small price changes observed in the data. One
rationalization for small price changes has been put forward by Midrigan (2007) and relies on
price setting behavior by a multiproduct ￿rm. Assuming that a restaurant faces a ￿xed cost of
reprinting the menu, any large deviation from the optimal price for one single item gives rise
to a free opportunity to reset price for all items in the menu. In such circumstances, one may
21The Monte Carlo experiments are described in more detail in section 5.1.
25observe small price changes of several items. Our model cannot capture such a rationalization
for small price changes since we have sampled one item (the main menu) in each outlet. However
the degree of within-outlet synchronization in price changes across items appears to be quite
limited in our data which suggests that the multiproduct argument does not fully rationalize
the occurrence of small price changes here.22
[Figure 5]
The estimated in￿ ation rate, which is obtained by averaging price changes at each date, is
rather well reproduced by our model. The average simulated monthly in￿ ation rates are 0.171%
and 0.166% in traditional and fast-food restaurants while the observed rates are respectively
0.134% and 0.135%.
5 Aggregate implications of the model
Our estimates are now used to examine the aggregate e⁄ects of minimum wage changes on the
price level in restaurants. Due to the non-linearity of our model as well as the heterogeneity
incorporated in our speci￿cation, the aggregate dynamics following a shock are non-trivial. We
thus investigate them through simulations. We illustrate the implications of our model by
comparing them with the predictions of a simpler, partial-adjustment linear model, which is
￿tted to aggregate data.
5.1 Assessing the impact of a minimum wage increase
The dynamic e⁄ect of a minimum wage increase on prices is assessed by conducting the following
simulation experiment. First, as in section 4.4, we simulate individual price trajectories by
inserting our estimates in the system of equations (2) - (3). Shocks "
p
i;t, "C+
i;t , and "C￿
i;t are drawn
from three i.i.d. normal distributions with mean 0 and variances equal to the estimated variances.
22For instance, among the restaurants for which the prices of three items are collected, the monthly frequency
of a single price change is 4.8%; the frequency of two simultaneous price changes is 1.9%, and 1.0% for three
simultaneous price changes.
26Paths for covariates are identical to their sample trajectories. To obtain more accurate and
smoother response functions, we simulate 40 trajectories for each actual sample trajectory. We
then aggregate all these individual price trajectories to compute a single path for the price level.
Second, we reiterate the experiment with the same set of random shocks, but now assume that
the minimum wage is permanently above its baseline trajectory as from July 1998. Three di⁄erent
scenarios are considered, corresponding to increases of 1%, 2% and 5% respectively. Finally, we
compare the alternative scenarios by computing di⁄erences in aggregate price levels between
the benchmark and each alternative scenario. This exercise provides only partial equilibrium
results, since we assume the exogeneity of the minimum wage with respect to restaurant prices,
and we assume other covariates (producer prices, demand) to be una⁄ected by the shock on the
minimum wage. We view these assumptions as reasonable approximations.23
[Table 7]
The main results of our simulation exercise are gathered in Table 7, as well as in Figures 6
and 7. Taking as a benchmark the case of a 1% increase, we observe that the long-run impact of
the shock on the minimum wage is to raise the price level by 0:130% in fast-food restaurants and
by 0:097% in traditional restaurants. These results are quite consistent with the estimated value
of the parameter ￿1 associated with the minimum wage. There appears a mild non-linearity,
since the impact of a 5% shock is slightly lower than ￿ve times the impact of a 1% shock. The
long-run impact of a minimum wage increase on restaurant prices is also in line with the one
that we would recover using a simple benchmarking exercise based on national account statistics
(see subsection 4.1).
[Figure 6 ]
A striking result is that the impact of the minimum wage change on restaurant prices is
very protracted. For traditional restaurants, after 14 months, only half of the long-run response
23As a crude test, we run Granger causality tests and we reject that monthly in￿ ation in restaurants causes
overall monthly in￿ ation and minimum wage changes. We also reject that minimum wage causes food input
in￿ ation. Non-causality between demand and restaurant prices cannot be fully rejected.
27has been materialized. After two years, only 75% of the long-run e⁄ect is completed. In the
case of fast-food restaurants, adjustment is faster but still very slow: the half-life of the shock
is 6 months, and after 12 months, 75% of the e⁄ect has been materialized. This protracted
adjustment means that, each month, only a small fraction of restaurants decides to revise their
prices. Part of the adjustment operates at the extensive margin, a point illustrated by Figure 6.
After a shock, the fraction of restaurants revising their price rises. By contrast, in Calvo￿ s model,
this fraction is constant. Since, here, the fraction of restaurants revising their price depends on
covariates, the speed of adjustment varies with the size of the shock. Indeed, with a 1% shock
on the minimum wage, the share of traditional restaurants adjusting their prices rises by 0:10
percentage point in the ￿rst month. These e⁄ects are larger in fast-food restaurants, the e⁄ect
is 0:25 percentage point in the ￿rst month after a 1% minimum wage shock (Figures 6).
5.2 Comparison with linear aggregate models
We compare the results obtained above with those resulting from a linear time series model ￿tted
to our aggregate data. One motivation for this exercise is provided by the methodology and
results proposed by Aaronson (2001), who estimates a linear model of restaurant price indices
to assess the impact of lagged, present and future values of the minimum wage on prices.24 He
￿nds a signi￿cant and rapid impact of the minimum wage on the prices set by di⁄erent types of
restaurants in the US and Canada.25
Tables 8 and 9 report the estimates of various autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models
for fast-food and traditional restaurants respectively. The general speci￿cation is the following:











where ￿pt is the sectoral in￿ ation rate (computed as a simple average of individual price changes)
and zj;t is a set of covariates (seasonal dummies, dummy variables for the euro cash changeover
24Wolfson and Belman (2004) use comparable time-series analysis at the industry level and ￿nd no signi￿cant
e⁄ect of the minimum wage on employment in the US.
25The relation between the minimum wage and the overall CPI in France has been analyzed by L￿ Horty and
Rault (2004) who estimate a VAR model.
28period, the growth rates of demand and of food producer prices). We investigate various speci-
￿cations, with and without seasonal dummies, and with various lags and leads of the minimum
wage. In the case of traditional restaurants, results reported in Table 8 show that these covari-
ates are often signi￿cant: the dummy variables corresponding to the VAT increase and to the
euro area changeover period, as well as autoregressive terms, are systematically signi￿cant. The
results are sensitive to the inclusion of seasonal dummies. The impact of the minimum wage
is not clear-cut: only the second lag is systematically signi￿cant (see Table 8). The long-run
e⁄ect of a permanent 1% increase in the minimum wage is estimated to be comprised between
0:015 and 0:148, i.e. somewhat lower than the e⁄ects obtained in the previous subsection by
aggregating microeconomic behaviors.
Results for fast-food restaurants are reported in Table 9. Only a few variables appear to
explain changes in the aggregate price level. When seasonal dummies are included, the con-
temporary e⁄ect of the minimum wage increase is signi￿cant but its lag has a negative sign.
Overall, the estimated long-run impact of a variation in the minimum wage is very small. It is
even negative under some speci￿cations.
[Figure 7 ]
Thus, the predictions of the linear model are rather at variance with those obtained in pre-
vious microsimulations. To understand these di⁄erences, it should ￿rst be noted that the linear
model does not disentangle strong seasonality e⁄ects from the e⁄ect of a change in the minimum
wage (an expected problem since most changes in the minimum wage level occur in July, see
section 3.3). Unlike what happens with US data (Aaronson, 2001), there are in France no geo-
graphical or within-year variations in the timing of minimum wage changes that would help for
identi￿cation. Moreover, the above results illustrate the fact that a linear aggregate model may
not adequately capture the protracted adjustment resulting from individual lumpy behaviors,
a property analyzed by Caballero and Engel (2003). Micro estimates tend to point to slower
adjustment than what macro estimates show. This is clearly suggested by the graphs in Figure
7. These graphs compare the impulse responses of a shock on the minimum wage for the two
estimated models. For fast-food restaurants, the linear model predicts an immediate adjustment
29(to a long-run target close to zero). In the case of traditional restaurants, the aggregate linear
model indicates that full adjustment is almost complete (90%) after 20 months, while reaching
the same relative adjustment requires 35 months according to the aggregate micro process (see
Table 7).
The analytical results obtained by Caballero and Engel (2003) help provide an understand-
ing of our results. These authors examine the performance of a partial adjustment model ￿tted
to aggregated data for measuring the speed of adjustment, when micro-level data are actually
governed by a simple lumpy adjustment model, namely a constant hazard (Calvo-type) process.
They show that the aggregate model is asymptotically able to capture the probability of ad-
justment embodied in the Calvo process (namely, when the number of ￿rms N is large and the
sample period T is long). However, when N and T are small or moderate, the speed of adjust-
ment is overestimated by a linear aggregate model. In addition, the approximation provided
by the linear partial adjustment model is particularly poor when the probability of adjustment
is low. All these mechanisms appear to be present here, especially in the case of traditional
restaurants, for which the probability of a price change is close to 5%.
Our empirical model is somewhat more complex than the analytical framework considered
by Caballero and Engel (2003). For instance, our model contains an additional element of non-
linearity. More precisely, our speci￿cation for the probability of a price change is able to respond
to a deviation from the target variable (see equations (2) and (3)). Moreover, we have introduced
several covariates as well as unobserved heterogeneity. As a consequence, the analytical results
obtained by Caballero and Engel (2003) may not give a full picture of the mechanisms operating
here. To further illustrate the relationship between lumpy adjustments at the individual level
and aggregate dynamics in our set-up, we perform the following Monte Carlo experiment. We
again use the model (2) and (3) as a data-generating process (DGP). We complete this DGP by
estimating simple autoregressive processes for covariates, namely the demand variable as well
as the producer price index for food. We also design a DGP for minimum wage changes in
the following way: every month of July, the minimum wage increase is drawn randomly from
a uniform distribution with support [2% ￿ 5%]. This mimics the actual process for changes in
the minimum wage. With this complete DGP, we are able to simulate trajectories of individual
30and aggregate prices for an arbitrary number of economic units N and time periods T. We
then simulate trajectories both for the size of our sample (T = 105, N = 2;948 for traditional
restaurants and N = 448 for fast-food restaurants) and for ￿large￿ T and N (T = 1;000 ,
N = 10;000). In a further step, we use the arti￿cial data thus generated to compute an aggregate
price index, and use arti￿cial aggregate data to estimate a linear model. This exercise, which is
in the spirit of that conducted by Attanasio (2000), provides us with the asymptotic predictions
of a linear approximated model when the DGP is given by the individual lumpy adjustment
process.26
Results are provided in Tables 10 and 11. First, these experiments con￿rm that, with a small
sample, it is di¢ cult to recover the e⁄ects of a minimum wage increase when using the linear
aggregate speci￿cation.27 For both types of restaurants, the simulated mean impact (0:09 in
traditional restaurants and 0:10 in fast-food restaurants) are quite consistent with the DGP
parameters but these estimates are associated with very high standard deviations (0:211 for
traditional restaurants and 0:165 for fast-food restaurants).28 The pseudo-true values derived
with a large sample (T = 1;000 and N = 10;000) are close to the true elasticity.
Second, we con￿rm that the aggregate model dramatically overestimates the adjustment
speed, as can be inferred for example from the sum of the autoregressive parameters. In respec-
tively fast-food restaurants and traditional restaurants, the sum of the AR parameters is equal
to 0:40 and 0:77 in the model ￿tted to actual data and to 0:66 and 0:82 in the Monte Carlo
￿small sample￿case. By contrast, in the Caballero-Engel set-up, we would expect this persis-
tence parameter to be close to 1 ￿ ￿; where ￿ is the frequency of price changes. In restaurants,
the frequency ranges between 5 and 10% (see Table 6). Note that the bias partly vanishes in
the asymptotic simulations, where the sum of the autoregressive parameters is equal to 0:86 for
26In accordance with the econometrics of misspeci￿ed models, the probability limits of the parameters can be
labeled ￿pseudo-true values￿ .
27The poor performance partly re￿ ects the restriction to one speci￿c class of time series models, namely ARDL
models. As suggested by Caballero and Engel (2003), the performance of an aggregate model may be improved
by incorporating, say, moving average terms in the model. We stick to the ARDL since it is the class of models
used in the empirical studies of price pass-through.
28We run 200 simulations.
31fast-food restaurants and 0:92 for traditional restaurants.
In sum, this exercise illustrates that a linear aggregate model is bound to be a poor ap-
proximation. Although the source of the imprecision is the non-linearity and the individual
heterogeneity present in the underlying process, it is ampli￿ed by the limited size of the avail-
able sample.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a unique dataset of individual price quotes to assess the impact
of the minimum wage on prices both in traditional and fast-food restaurants. Given that, in
this sector, price changes are scarce, we have adopted an empirical model that features lumpy
adjustment. Using this framework, we provide arguably better identi￿ed estimates of the impact
of the minimum wage on prices.
We ￿nd that the minimum wage has a positive and signi￿cant impact on prices in traditional
and fast-food restaurants. The estimated elasticity of prices with respect to the minimum wage is
around 0.10 for both types of outlets. This impact is consistent with the share of minimum-wage
compensations in total costs that can be estimated with macroeconomic data. This elasticity
is higher than that found by MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) for the US. This presumably
re￿ ects the lower fraction of workers paid the minimum wage in U.S. restaurants (25% in the
U.S. versus more than 40% in France).
Taking into account lumpiness in the microeconomic adjustment of prices, we exhibit such a
protracted impact of the minimum wage on aggregate prices. The aggregate impact estimated
with our model typically takes more than a year to pass through to retail prices. We show that
such protracted impact is di¢ cult to capture using aggregate data. In terms of price rigidity,
our results indicate that, although one main reason for restaurant price stickiness is that one
important determinant of the cost (namely, the minimum wage) changes infrequently, there is
also a substantial degree of ￿intrinsic￿ stickiness. Price stickiness is not a mere re￿ ection of
cost stickiness. In addition, our results point to the crucial role of non-linearity and individual
heterogeneity in in￿ ation dynamics.
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378 Tables and ￿gures
Table 1: Monthly frequency of price changes (%)
Sample Price Price Price Implied average
size changes increases decreases price duration
Traditional restaurants 93,816 4.16 3.80 0.36 24.04
Fast-food restaurants 10,726 9.41 7.07 2.34 10.63
Note: the implied average price duration (in months) is calculated as the inverse of the monthly propor-
tion of price changes.
Table 2: Size of price changes (%)
Sample size ￿p90 ￿p75 ￿p50 ￿p25 ￿p10 ￿pav
Traditional restaurants ￿p￿ 340 -13.36 -8.54 -3.95 -1.30 -0.26 -6.09
￿p+ 3,909 8.00 5.25 3.18 1.65 0.30 4.34
Fast-food restaurants ￿p￿ 269 -7.55 -5.09 -2.78 -0.95 -0.55 -3.74
￿p+ 844 5.88 3.66 2.82 1.29 0.34 3.35
Note: In the calculations, price changes equal to zero are not taken into account. Price increases ￿p+
and decreases ￿p￿ are considered separately. ￿p90 is the 90th percentile of the distribution; ￿p75 is the
75th percentile of the distribution; ￿p50 is the median of the distribution; ￿p25 is the 25th percentile
of the distribution; ￿p10 is the 10th percentile of the distribution; ￿pav is the average price change.
























































Value of the log-likelihood function =-8.231
Sample size: 93,816




















































































Value of the log-likelihood function = -11.0061
Sample size: 10,726
40Table 5: E⁄ects of a 1% minimum wage increase on prices:
benchmark estimates
Firm size Wage level (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Traditional restaurants Min. wage 0.12 0.40 0.31 1 0.11 0.11
1:1￿ Min. wage 0.12 0.40 0.17 0.7 0.04 0.15
Fast-food restaurants Min. wage 0.12 0.33 0.32 1 0.09 0.09
(Assumption 1) 1:1￿ Min. wage 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.7 0.03 0.13
Fast-food restaurants Min. wage 0.12 0.46 0.32 1 0.13 0.13
(Assumption 2) 1:1￿ Min. wage 0.12 0.46 0.17 0.7 0.05 0.18
Note: Column (1) reports the share of workers in the black market for hotels and restaurants (ACOSS,
2006). Column (2) reports the share of labor cost in total cost (Assumption 1: French national sectoral
accounts (1997-2002); Assumption 2: Parsley and Wei, 2007). Column (3) reports the share of the
minimum wage compensations in the wage bill (DARES and French national sectoral accounts (1997-
2002)). Column (4) gives the elasticity of wages just above the minimum wage with respect to minimum
wage increases (Koubi and Lhommeau, 2006). Column (5) gives the e⁄ect of the minimum wage increase
on total cost, i.e. col.(5) = (1-col(1)) ￿ col.(2) ￿ col.(3) ￿ col. (4). Column (6) is the cumulated sum
of the lines of column (5).
41Table 6: Goodness of ￿t
Size of price changes Frequency of price changes




























Observed 0.135 3.346 -3.739 7.070 2.335 9.405
Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations.
Table 7: Simulation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)


















Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations. Column (1) is the size of the shock on the
minimum wage at t. Column (2) reports the cumulated impact after 57 months. Column (3) reports
the duration (in months) corresponding to half of the total cumulated impact. Column (4) reports the
duration (in months) corresponding to 75% of the total cumulated impact. Column (5) reports the
duration (in months) corresponding to 90% of the total cumulated impact.
42Table 8: Linear model estimated with aggregate data (traditional restaurants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.124￿￿ 0.052￿￿ 0.044￿￿ 0.094￿￿ -0.008 0.044
Min. waget+3 -0.007￿ 0.002
Min. waget+2 0.003 -0.080
Min. waget+1 -0.005 0.015
Min. waget -0.011￿￿ -0.009￿￿ 0.004 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003
Min. waget￿1 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.012
Min. waget￿2 0.014￿￿ 0.017￿￿ 0.020￿￿ 0.013￿￿ 0.019￿￿ 0.008
Min. waget￿3 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012
Min. waget￿4 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 0.009 0.008 -0.043￿￿
Min. waget￿5 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.009
Min. waget￿6 0.013￿￿ 0.014￿￿ 0.011￿￿ 0.005 0.005 -0.011
In￿ ationt￿1 0.130￿ 0.127￿ 0.198￿￿ 0.171￿￿
In￿ ationt￿2 0.263￿￿ 0.268￿￿ 0.217￿￿ 0.240￿￿
In￿ ationt￿3 0.202￿￿ 0.216￿￿ 0.331￿￿ 0.216￿￿
Producer prices 0.009 0.005 0.019 0.007 0.001 0.016
Demand 0.004 0.005 0.007￿￿ 0.006 0.003 0.008
VAT increase 0.059 0.066 0.110 0.074 0.114￿￿ 0.115￿￿
VAT decrease -0.015 -0.049 -0.033 0.011 -0.004 -0.015
Pre Euro 0.139￿￿ 0.091￿￿ 0.100￿￿ 0.156￿￿ 0.088￿￿ 0.141￿￿
Euro 0.662￿￿ 0.573￿￿ 0.597￿￿ 0.581￿￿ 0.453￿￿ 0.545￿￿
Post Euro 0.021 -0.153￿￿ -0.152￿￿ 0.034 -0.183￿￿ -0.140￿￿
Month dummies N N N Y Y Y
R-squared 0.653 0.720 0.786 0.733 0.826 0.856
Long-term impact 0.012 0.043 0.049 0.016 0.118 0.148
Note: statistical signi￿cance levels: ￿￿: 5%, ￿: 10%.
43Table 9: Linear model estimated with aggregate data (fast-food restaurants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.136￿￿ 0.088￿￿ 0.090￿￿ 0.130 0.046 0.002
Min. waget+3 0.000 0.007
Min. waget+2 -0.016 -0.019
Min. waget+1 -0.014 -0.008
Min. waget 0.031￿ 0.036￿￿ 0.039￿￿ 0.035￿ 0.040￿￿ 0.044￿
Min. waget￿1 -0.032￿￿ -0.036￿￿ -0.046￿￿ -0.037￿ -0.041￿￿ -0.062￿￿
Min. waget￿2 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.010
Mini. waget￿3 0.015 0.023 0.020 0.005 0.017 0.015
In￿ ationt￿1 0.164 0.168 0.189￿ 0.198￿
In￿ ationt￿2 0.182￿ 0.178￿ 0.199￿ 0.201￿
Producer prices 0.051 0.045 0.057 0.079 0.070 0.069
Demand 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.003 -0.007
Euro -0.091 -0.055 -0.051 -0.170 -0.157 -0.149
Month dummies N N N Y Y Y
R-squared 0.109 0.176 0.201 0.176 0.254 0.291
Long-term impact 0.015 0.039 -0.020 0.009 0.044 -0.023
Note: statistical signi￿cance levels: ￿￿: 5%, ￿: 10%.
44Table 10: Aggregate results with simulated data
(traditional restaurants)
OLS - aggregate data OLS - simulated data OLS - simulated data

























































Month dummies Y Y Y
Long-term impact 0.137 0:092
(0:211)
0.071
Note: Column (1) reports the OLS estimates obtained with actual aggregate data. Column (2)
reports the OLS estimates obtained with aggregate simulated data and a small sample size (T = 105,
N = 2;948). Here the probability of a price change is endogenous. Column (3) reports the OLS estimates
with aggregate simulated data and a large sample size (T = 1;000, N = 10;000):
45Table 11: Aggregate results with simulated data
(fast-food restaurants)
OLS - aggregate data OLS - simulated data OLS - simulated data





































Month dummies Y Y Y
Long-term impact 0.043 0:096
(0:165)
0.112
Note: Column (1) reports the OLS estimates obtained with actual aggregate data. Column (2)
reports the OLS estimates obtained with aggregate simulated data and a small sample size (T = 105,
N = 448). Here the probability of a price change is endogenous. Columns (3) reports the OLS estimates
with aggregate simulated data and a large sample size (T = 1;000, N = 10;000).
46Figure 1: Examples of price trajectories
Note: each line corresponds to a price trajectory for a menu in a restaurant, prices are expressed in euros.




















Note: Solid line, left scale: monthly in￿ ation in restaurants. Dashed line, left scale: monthly in￿ ation in
fast-food restaurants. Bars, right scale: monthly minimum wage increases.
47Figure 3a: Frequency of price changes in traditional restaurants
Figure 3b: Frequency of price changes in fast-food restaurants
Note: Solid line: Frequency of price changes. Dashed line: Frequency of price increases. Dotted line:
Frequency of price decreases
48Figure 4: Distribution of price changes
Note: Price changes equal to zero are not taken into account.
49Figure 5: Actual versus simulated price change distributions
Notes: Black bars: simulated price change distribution. Dashed bars: actual price change distribution.
50Figure 6a: Impact of a minimum wage increase on the frequency of price changes
in traditional restaurants
Figure 6b: Impact of a minimum wage increase on the frequency of price changes
in fast-food restaurants
Note: Solid line: 1% increase. Dotted line: 2% increase. Dashed line: 5% increase
51Figure 7a: Aggregate response to a minimum wage increase
(traditional restaurants)
Figure 7b: Aggregate response to a minimum wage increase
(fast-food restaurants)
Note: Solid line: simulated average aggregate response. Dotted line: bounds of the 95% con￿dence
interval. Dashed line: response derived from the linear model estimated with aggregate data.
52Appendix
Figure A1: Distributions of the cumulated minimum wage increase since the last
price change
Note: black bars for traditional restaurants, dashed bars for fast-food restaurants. Decreases in
employers￿social contributions are included in labor cost at minimum wage.
53Figure A2: Distributions of durations and hazard functions
Note: Hazard functions are estimated using a simple piecewise-constant duration model.
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